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The Formation of Diplomatic Policy in New China and its Main
New China ‘s diplomacy in the early days displayed an obvious "extroversion，"as demonstrated by the concern and support for revolutionary movements outsideChina.In part this was inspired by the Chinese revolution，and the desire thatthe victory would have a great influence throughout the world ，or at least onChina ’s neighbors.However，this "extroversion"did not have an overwhelminginfluence on New China‘s diplomacy ，and the domestic orientation remained dominant，as the policy decisions made with respect to the war against French aggression andaid to Vietnam，and the battle against American aggression and aid to Korea，fullydemonstrate. During negotiations with the Soviets on a new treaty，the Chinese leadershipmade the decision to aid Vietnam in its fight against the French.This was a strategicdecision of great significance both in terms of the guiding principles of New China‘s diplomatic strategy and in terms of its influence on later Chinese diplomacy. One of the successes of this decision was that it did not involve China in aforeign war nor upset the domestic agenda.There was therefore no divergence ofopinion among the top leaders in this regard.Liu Shaoqi explained the relationshipbetween aiding Vietnam and China‘s security：If China did not aid Vietnam theenemy would stay in Indo-China and "there would be more difficulties and troubles for us."17 In contrast ，the decision to resist America and aid Korea was much more difficult，since it involved the underlying question of New China‘s diplomacy. New China began to provide assistance to North Korea soon after it was Founded.With the outbreak of the Korean War ，the organization of the Northeast FrontierArmy got underway on a grand scale from the middle of July in case of emergencies. The speech made by Zhou Enlai at the preparatory conference of the NortheastFrontier Army on 26August expressed the basic views of the Chinese leadership withregard to the Korean War，i.e ，that as a result of American military involvement ，the Korean war "has become the central issue of current world conflict."This wasnot only "a problem for a brotherly neighbor，"but also a threat to the securityof Northeast China.China must thus be prepared to enter the war，to help the NorthKoreans unify their country and "wipe out the American forces one by one ."Perhapsin order to induce the armed forces to agree to shelving the plan of liberatingTaiwan for the time being，he added that victory in the Korean War would pave the wayfor the solution of the Taiwan issue.18 The landing in Inchon of American forces abruptly turned the tide of the warand made it unfavorable to the North Koreans.Almost simultaneously on 1Octoberthe Chinese leaders received Kim Il-sung‘s request for armed assistance and Stalin’s letter to the same effect.The situation on the battlefield was now even worsethan they had anticipated in August Although it was felt that the consequences ofChina entering the war could be very serious，Mao Zedong made a rapid decisionto dispatch troops to Korea.It is worth noting that in the telegram he draftedto Stalin on 2October Mao Zedong focused on the losses that the Korean revolutionwould suffer and the negative influence on the "whole east"if American forces occupiedthe entire peninsula.He made no reference to the threat to China ‘s own security，which was stressed again and again when the Chinese leadership explained to theChinese people the rationale of sending troops to Korea.19 Mao Zedong‘s decision quickly met with opposition from his colleagues.It isstill not certain how many of the decision-makers opposed him ，but the numbercould not have been small since Mao Zedong was forced to change his decision . Two factors were responsible for reversing the decision to send troops to Korea：Firstly，some of the decision-makers did not approve of dispatching troops.In their opinion，the first priority should be given to domestic needs.Secondly ，even Mao Zedong himself ，although full of revolutionary fervor and strongly infavor of sending troops ，had serious misgivings and believed that military failurewould have serious political，economic and security consequences for China. Under such circumstances，pressure from Stalin played a decisive role.In histelegram to Mac Zedong on about 5October Stalin stressed that China‘s participationin the war would compel the US to make concessions and "give up Taiwan，"and thatChina "could not even get Taiwan’‘if it did not enter the war.20Stalin ’s hintat possible betrayal of China over thc question of Taiwan must have had a profoundimpact on the Chinese leaders.Stalin issued a more serious warning in his talkswith Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao on 11October.He stressed that American occupationof North Korea would pose a Long term threat to the security of China and exerta negative influence on economic development in the northeast.Furthermore，ifNorth Korea fell，its cadres and main forces would swarm into northeast China.21 According to documents made public.Chinese leaders in BeiJing had already receivedreports about Stalin‘s view before 13October.Mao Zedong’s telegram to Zhou Enlaion 13October showed that he was giving first priority to national security.Inthe same telegram Mao Zedong instructed Zhou Enlai to secure Soviet weapons on creditso that the national budget would guarantee the needs of economic and cultural construction；only in this way could China sustain the war effort in Korea for any length oftime and "`maintain the unity of the majority at home."22On the same day Mao Zedongsummoned the Soviet ambassador to China ，Nocola Rosin ，to an interview and saidto him that China was unable to buy Soviet weapons in cash and had to get them oncredit.in this way the 1951national budget would not be disrupted and "the democraticparties would be more easily convinced of our argument for entering the war ."23 When Mao Zedong finally decided to send troops to Korea he had shifted the focusof his concern from "fulfilling the international duty‘’to the interests of nationalsecurity.At the same time，he also tried his utmost to reduce the negative impactof entering the war on the efforts to improve the war-torn economy and thereby toovercome resistance to his decision.It could therefore be concluded that China‘s role in the Korean War did not fundamentally alter the introversion of New China’s diplomacy ；only a new balance between introversion and extroversion was achieved，with a bias towards introversion. III.The Historical Significance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence The CPC Central Committee first formally announced the principles of New Chinawith regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations soon after the People‘s Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River.As the spokesman of the General Headquartersof the Chinese People ’s Liberation Army ，on 30April Mao Zedong promulgatedthe principles for establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries：New Chinawas willing "to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreigncountries ；and such relations must be based on equality ，mutual benefit ，mutualrespect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and ，first of all ，on no helpbeing given to the Guomindang reactionaries."24We do not know the detailed processof drafting and announcing this statement ，but it could have been a response tothe American search for contacts with the Chinese Communists，and a tactic forruling out military intervention from foreign countries.In other words ，it wasmade for the final victory of the Chinese revolution.共2頁: 1 [2] 下一頁 論文出處(作者):The Formation of Diplomatic Policy in New China and
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